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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Of fHE STATE Of UTAH 
FLQYD W~BSTER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
"s. Appeal No. 19339 
~ARY LEHMER AND CHARLES LEHMER, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
rhe parties to this appeal are: 
Mary Lehmer, 570 Deer Valley Road, Park City, 
Utah, 84060 
Floyd Webster, 95 North 3rd West, Heber City, 
Utah, 84032 
Charles Lehmer died during the course of this litiga-
tion and Mary Lehmer, John Lehmer, and Susi Lehmer Kontgis, the 
lawful heirs of the decedent, succeeded to all of his rights, 
'1tle and interest. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Respondent Floyd Webster ("Webster") seeks 
-=•c1s•tJn ot a contract for the sale of his interest in a 
cJuse and land in Park City, Utah and Defendants/Appellants 
Mary and Charles Lehmer ( "Lehmers"), in a counterchirn, 
for specific performance of the contract. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURI 
Webster commenced this action in the District 
for summit County, Utah on July 14, 1981 seeking res"tssicr, t 
the sale of any interest he had in the house and land in Pan 
City, Utah. The comp" nt alleged, in seven causes of ection, 
vagueness and amb1gu1 of the agreement, insuff ic1ent :en-
sideration, violation of the statute of frauds, no meeting o: 
the minds, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, ano 
breach of the contract. ( R. l) .l/ Lehmers answered the coo-
plaint and counterclaimed, seeking specific performance of the 
agreement. ( R. 7) After discovery and before trial, Webster 
filed an amended complaint asserting additional gr~unds tcr 
rescission of the contract, including mutual and unilater1i: 
mistake of fact, undue influence and breach ot trust and cc,11-
fidence in the formation and execution of the agreement. 
(R.175, 179, 199) 
At the conclusion of the trial to the court, conducted 
on January 18th through 20, 1983, the court announced its 
ruling in favor of Webster. (T.414-419) • The district cuurt 
..!/ References are to the Trial Transcript ( "T"), the designated rec0 r-' 
from the District Court file ( "R"). 
2 
J.... 
,01 ,t,cce•j ;udgment (R.367-369) and made its initial findings of 
t", ,1nrl crcnclusions of law on April 18, 1983 (R.360-366) and 
.,,,Je ar,1cnrler1 findings of fact and conclusions of law on June 
1), I cl 8 3 • (R.491-499). On June 15, 1983 the Court also 
denie11 Lehmers' motion to amend the findings of fact and 
:onc[,,1sions rif law or, alternatively, to grant a new trial. 
I, R.489-.J90). 
The amended findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and order denying Lehmers' motions were filed on June 29, 
i983. ( R. 49 3) • The district court's judgment granted 
Webster's requested relief of rescission of the real estate 
3greement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Lehmers seek reversal of the district court's 
~rder of rescission dated April 18, 1983 of the real estate 
contract by reason of prejudicial errors of law. This Court 
should remit the case to the district court with directions to 
enter an order of sl)ecific performance of the real estate 
CC:lntract in favor of Lehmers or, alternatively, order a new 
trial on Lehmers' entitlement to specific performance, all in 
1 '"cr1~nce with the opinion of this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
l. Did the district court err in denying Lehmers' 
rnotio 01 in limine and in receiving at trial testimony regarding 
3 
the fair market value of the undivided tee simple 
the subject property, when Webster only owned and d t 
Lehmers squatter's rights in the building imr:irovem~"t' ,. 
premises? 
2. Did the district court err in conclud>.ng thir 
Webster had proven either a legally adequate mutual or unil;-
teral mistake ot fact sufficient to permit rescission of tc,, 
agreement? 
3. Did Webster fail to prove and did the district 
court err in ruling that Webster lacked mental capacity and 
was incapable of understanding the agreement? 
4. Did the district court err in concluding that 
there existed a confidential relationship between the Lehmers 
and Webster such that a duty is due vlebster by Lehmers in the 
real estate transaction? 
5. Did the district court err in concluding that the 
confidential relationship existed between the Lehmers •~ 
Webster such that Webster was subJect to the undue infl11ence 
of the Lehmers? 
6. Did the district court err in refusing to grant 
Lehmers' claim for specific performance of the agreement? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
l. The Parties and The Squatter's Rights. 
Appellants Mary and Charles Lehmer at all le 1 e 
times lived on what had been known as Heber Avenue, and wraL 
4 
L 
--
,s ""'; known as Deer Valley Road, in Park City, Utah. 
- : ld-l 39, 222; Lehmer 5/4/82 depo. p. 7) .~/ Mary Lehmer is 
·' retired lawyer who practiced many years pt:imarily in the 
area of tam1ly law with some experience in t:eal estate matters. 
iT.222; Lehmer- 5/4/82 depo. pp. 25-26). Mr. Webster is a 
retired m1net: and mechanic who has lived, with some interrup-
ttons, f0r approximately forty yeat:s in a house on a piece of 
property located on Deer Valley Road in Park City, Utah. 
IT.95-%, 103; Webster 1/7/83 depo. pp. 7-9). Webster, 
together with his late wife, on May 3, 1948, acquired a 
possessory right and intei:est in a four room fi:ame dwelling 
house in Park City, Summit County, Utah by Quit Claim Deed 
!the "syuatter's eights). (T.95; Ex. lo. i .. Y In 1948 and 
ront1nu1ng thei:eafter, the underlying fee simple interest 
and ownership of the subJect pi:operty were held in independent 
( T. 5 5) • The title to the i:eal pi:operty on which 
Lehrners and Webstei: lived in Park City was originally owned by 
United Park City Mining Company and in 1971 was sold to Royal 
Street Land Company. ( T. 55). 
2/ 
- The jepositions of Floyd Webster of May 4, 1982 and January 
1 • 1%3, as well as the May 4, 1982 deposition of Mary Lehmer 
•ere all, upon motion, published before and used by the trial 
:ourt as evidence under Rule 32 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil 
rrocedure. IT. 238, 419; R. 301). 
1' 
All exhibit references are 
·..ihet-her offered by Webster or 
secutively. IR.313, 314). 
to the trial exhibits which, 
Lehmer s, were numbered con-
5 
Webster, in the course of his employment for tl,e 
mining company and subsequent to his retirement from thaL 
position, worked as a mechanic on sophisticated mining machi-
nery, on equipment owned by Park City and on machinery an,j 
vehicles for various other individuals. (T. 104-l06, 
136-137). In conjunction with this mechanical work, Webster 
used and understood technical manuals and printed materials 
concerning the machinery and vehicles on which he workea. 
(T.137; Webster 1/7/83 depo. pp. 57-58). 
2. The Relationship Between Webster and Lehmers. 
Webster and Lehmers were neighbors in Park City from 
1972 to 1980 and on occasion would see each other when passing 
in the neighborhood. (T.138-142; Webster 1/7/83 depo. pp. 
107-108). Lehmers and Webster and his wife, who died in 1975, 
did not socialize together and except for one occasion, we' 
not guests in the others home. (T.112, 139-140; Webster 1/7/ 
depo. p. 108). Although Webster trusted the Lehmers, he w,; 
not under the influence of or dominated by the Lehmers during 
October through December, 1980 or at any other time. 
(T.168-169). Webster had never relied upon the Lehmers for 
business advice or the conduct of his day to day affairs ar.a 
Webster was capable of making his own independent dec1s1nn' 
regarding business matters and entering into cont- raci-. 
(T.169-170; Webster 1/7/83 depo. pp. 106-108). 
6 L 
--
During the course of their acquaintance, Webster had 
0ccas iona 1 odd jobs for Lehmers, such as helping with 
minor repairs on their house and automobiles, for which 
Lehmers gave him some small compensation, (T.110-111, 
252-253; Webster 1/7/83 depo. pp. 17-20), 
3. Formation of the Contract. 
Un October 7, 1980, the Lehmers happened to see 
Webster in the neighborhood and invited him to come into their 
home to discuss Webster's "squatter's r-ights" on the subject 
property on Deer Valley Road. At the time, Webster was 
unmar-ried, his wife having earlier- died in 1975, The Lehmers 
inquired of Webster if he would be interested in selling his 
squatter's interest subject to his right to remain permanently 
on the property for the balance of his life for $5 ,000 .00, 
IT. 101-102, 167-168). Without extended discussion, and with-
out any representations on the µart of the Lehmers as to the 
value, title or quality of the squatter's rights which Webster 
owned, Webster accepted the offer to purchase subject to the 
right nf Webster to live on the property, personally, as long 
as he desired, ( T. 101-102, 169-170, 175: Webster 5/4/82 
depo, p. 26). 
Mary Lehmer wrote out in longhand a contract of sale 
of Webster-'s squatter's rights which, prior to signing, was 
read and understood by Webster and the Lehmers,i/ 
4/ 
- T. 170-174; Webster 5/4/82 depo. pp. 23, 24, 30, 35; Lehmer 
5/4/82 depo. pp. 37,39,421 Ex. 11. 
7 
In late October 19 80' Webster dee ided 
the subject property and live with his for-mer- nei<cJhbor, 
Dudley, in Heber City, Utah. (T. 283-284). Webster ad·ii, 
Lehmers of that intention and by the end of November 1980 , 
Webster had voluntarily r-emoved himself Er-om the suhJect 
property. Because of that fact and in further considerat,Jn 
of the Lehmers agreeing to pay delinquent public utility ,nj 
sanitary fees, as well as unpaid taxes and attor-ney's fees er, 
Webster's squatter's r-ights, the Lehmers and Webster enterec 
into an amended agreement of sale on December 21, 1980 wherern 
Webster agreed to surrender and r-elease his tenancy of the 
subject property which had been r-eserved in the origina' 
agreement. (T. 128-133; Ex. 12). 
Under the terms of the real estate agr-eement, che 
Lehmers were to arrange for a survey of the pr-oper-ty and f!te· 
pare a quitclaim deed based on the survey. In mid 0< ber 
1980, Mrs. Lehmer retained an engineer- to prepare and cc dfy 
the required survey. The survey took sever-al months to com-
plete. (T. 180, 293-294). 
On numerous occasions between October- 7 and the end 
of December 
ratified and 
by: 
1980, Webster 
implemented the 
specifically 
agreement of 
and unequivocally 
sale with Lehmer; 
requesting of and receiving from Lehmers 
$100.00 cash toward the purchase price on 
8 
two occasions in October of 1980; (T. 125, 
126, 179); 
requesting of and receiving from Lehmer 
$500.00 cash toward the purchase price in 
November of 1980. (T. 126, 179, 183); 
requesting of and receiving from Lehmers 
200.00 cash toward the purchase price on 
December 21, 1980. (T. 181, 183); 
signed an affidavit on December 21, 1980, 
prepared by the Lehmers to terminate what 
was believed to be his deceased wife's joint 
tenancy in the property. 
13) ; 
(T. 132-33, Ex. 
gave Lehmers a key to the house located on 
the subJect property. (T. 187); 
removed his personal possessions from the 
house and moved in with Mary Dudley in Heber 
City. (T. 187; Webster 5/4/82 depo. pp. 67-71). 
In additional furtherance and implementation of the 
agreement, the Lehmers obtained the survey on the property, 
paid for the same and paid the public utilities and sanitary 
fees. (T. 293-295, 298-299). Lehmers prepared a quitclaim 
Jegd to Webster's squatter's rights and, in January 1981, Mary 
i_ehmpr spoke with Webster by telephone to arrange a date for 
t trial c Losing, payment of the balance due under the contract 
9 
of sale and execution of the quitclaim deed. Webster 
0
,.,L 
reaffirmed the contract and it was agreed that the pa;,, ... 
would set a convenient date, after Mrs. Lehmer recc)'Jered fr 
an illness, for the final closing. (T. 293-294). 
In early February 1981, Lehmers sent to Webster u ,; 
negotiable draft for $1, 100 .oo in further part payment '.:t ,,,, 
purchase price and thereupon attempted to arrange with viebs'.'r 
a date for closing on the property. 
draft but did not negotiate it.2/ 
Webster accepted :1,, 
4. The Royal Street Land Company. 
On October 7, 1980, the underlying fee interest in 
the sub]ect property was owned by Royal Street Land Compan1,, a 
real estate development company and the Park City ski reson 
operator. (T. 45-46, 55). Title to the fee simple interest 
of the underlying ground on the squatter's riqhts of Webster 
could have been reasonably ascertained by a review of c1,1 
record title in the office of the county recorder for surom1: 
County, in Coalville, Utah. (Webster 1/7 /83 de po. pp. 94-97" 
At the time of the execution of the October 7, 198,i 
agreement between Webster and the Lehmers, Royal Street ha.J 
developed an "informal" and ad hoc policy of selling the 
2/ T. 292-293, 299-300; Webster 5/4/82 depo. pp. 72-74, 
82-84; Lehmer 5/4/82 depo. p. 35. 
10 + 
'""er lying title to Deer Valley "squatters" tor 50 cents a 
'c'.Juare foot (T. 57). The policy was not only undeclared and 
"npubli~lteo, it was not generally disseminated in the Park 
c· 1 ty area. (T. 56-57). The testimony is absolutely clear 
that the Lehmers were not aware of any informal or ad hoc 
~olicy of Royal Street between October and December 1980. (T. 
268-269' 286-287). 
To the contrary, Mary Lehmer had chatted with neigh-
bors in the Deer Valley area in casual conversation, and had 
suggested that should Royal Street attempt to evict any of the 
"squatters" from their land, all of the squatters and others 
similarly situated should join together, retain an attorney 
and fight Royal Street. (T. 236-241, 301). 
On the other hand, Webster had been told by a neigh-
bor, Neil Clegg, prior to October 1980, that Royal Street 
might have an informal policy in which the underlying fee 
title could be acquired and that Webster should check with 
Poyal Street to determine whether that policy would apply to 
his squatter's interest. (T. 324-331). Similar information 
was given to Webster by Alma Pedersen, a co-worker for Park 
City, long before October 1980. (Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 66). 
Webster made no attempt to take Clegg's advice or to otherwise 
'ocerta1n the underlying fee title. (T. 147-150). 
11 
s. Webster's Lack of Concern Regarding the IJnderl_t_i_1_1';1 
Fee Title tJ his Squatter's Interest. 
r'rom the time that Webster 
squatter's interest in 1948, he knew he d1d not 
underlying property. (Webster 1/7/83 depo p. 421. 
w' 
Yet, 
neither had any desire to nor did he attempt tc ascertatc, 
title of the underlying fee simple of the ground ·,;here c,, 
home was situated. He made no inquiry at any time nn the 5 ,":-
j ect. (T. 147-150) 
Although Webster claimed, only after amending ,, 1, 
complaint, that as of October 7, 1980, he believed t:.e 
underlying fee of his squatter's property was owned bJ' tre 
by the U. S. Bureau of Land Management ( BLM), the undisput;.: 
and pivotal fact is that it did not make any diEEerence t: 
Webster who was the owner of the underlying fee as of 0ctocec 
7' 1980 he would have still, at that time, sold his 2r:· 
perty to the Lehmers for $5,000.00. (Webster 1/7 /83 depo. f· 
72). Webster stated on the witness stand: 
"Q Now, with regard to whether the ground surround-
ing your property was owned by the BLM or by 
Royal Street, it didn't make any difference to 
you, did it, at the time you sold the property 
to Mrs. Lehmer? 
A No, it didn't. 
12 
0 In other words, whether the BLM owned it or whether 
Royal Street owned it, you would have sold it 
to Mrs. Lehmer for $5,000; isn't that right? 
I\ Yes." 
IT. 147-148 l. 
on redirect examination by his own counsel, Webster 
again reaft1rmed his testimony that regardless of the under-
lying ownership of the property in Royal Street or in the BLM, 
he would have still sold his squatter's rights to the property 
for $5,000.00. (T. 195). Webster stated that in October 1980 
he believed $5,000.00 was a fair value to pay for his 
squatter's rights. (T. 179) 
The Lehmers did not cause Webster to believe that his 
home was situated on BLM ground. ( T. 155) • Lehmers made no 
representations or statements to Webster, directly or 
indirectly, with regard to the title of the underlying fee to 
Webster's surface interest. (T. 101-102, 169-170, 175). 
Webster never advised the Lehmers that he thought his home was 
on BLM ground. (T. 163, 169-170). 
6. The Mental Capacity of Webster. 
The record at trial is clear that Webster was a man 
uf at least reasonable if not above average intelligence, that 
lie knew and understood the consequences of his agreement to 
sell the squatter's rights to the Lehmers, that he intended to 
SPll those rights on October 7, 1980, that he believed at that 
13 
time $5,000.00 to be a fair price for his squatter's lnte,c,, 
and that he was not under any disability as ot that ,
1310 
(T. 143-144, 171-172, 179, 184). 
Yet, Webster claimed at trial that he was a drur,k, 
alcoholic, and that he was depressed because of the death 
his wife. His wife had died more than five years hefore ti;e 
date of the conveyance. While he did drink wine, he was rnt 
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the agreement, 
he had never required medical help for any drinking problem, 
and he was in full control of his l:'aculties and actions in 
October, November and December of 1980. (T. 142-144; WebstH 
1/7/83 depo. p. 24). Indeed, Webster made a conscious dec1-
sion to move from the subJect premises to Heber City in oder 
to begin living with the former neighbor of he and his wife, 
Mary Dudley. (T. 181, 283-284). While Webster's driver'' 
license had been revoked in 1979 for driving under tne 
influence, Webster had never thereafter attempted to reapplj' 
or obtain another license. (Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 24). 
The Lehmers were not aware of any claimed alcohnl1' 
problem of Webster; they only knew that he took a social drd 
as did others in the community. (Webster 1/7/83 depo. PP• 
26-27). 
There is no testimony that in October 1980 f1eb 5t" 
was incapable of handling or administering his affairs, 
comprehending the reasonable consequences ot his conduct, or 
---
')f being unable to comprehend the value of his squatter's 
Webster had been accustomed to entering into 
corrtracts tor the sale of automobiles, appliances and other 
chatrPls, he readily understood complex mechanical manuals and 
he read the daily newspaper. (T. 136-138). At the trial, he 
did have a stutter and a halting gate in his speech. (T. 135). 
when asked by his counsel to read from the written contract of 
October 7, 1970, Webster read the words out loud to the court, 
tripping over some vowels and larger words as he went. 
However, he gave a reasonable clear definition of the terms 
and comprehension of the condition of sale. (T. 170-172). 
'· Relief of the Parties as to Ownership and Value of 
the Squatter's Rights. 
In October 1980, Webster and the Lehmers were of the 
understanding that the squatter's rights of Webster were held 
by him and his late wife as joint tenants. (T. 178-179, 
22)-226' 233). In fact, that was the view of Webster at the 
time when the complaint was filed in July 1981, In an amended 
complaint, Webster claimed the property was held between him-
self and his wife as tenants in common and that his daughters 
were, therefore, entitled to an interest in the property 
because his wife had died intestate. (R. 181). At trial, the 
1_~r1mer:; acknowledged that if Webster was not the surviving 
1rJ1nt t-_enant, he could only be ordered by specific performance 
t 'J c.. 1 ir1vey the interest which he agreed to "quitclaim" to the 
15 
Lehrners, namely, an undivided 1/2 interest as a tendnt in 
''II· 
mon plus an undivided 1/3 of his deceased wife's l ;• tntere" 
( T. 304). 
There were no representations, statements, or 0 ~ 1 _ 
nions expressed, made, or uttered, directly or indirectly,~,. 
the Lehmers to Webster on or about October 7, 1980, •itr, 
regard to the value of Webster's squatter's interest in 
property. ( T. 101-102, 169-1 70, 1 75; Webster 5/4/82 depo. f. 
26). At the date of the transaction, the Lehmers believed 
the fair market value of Webster's squatter's rights was .•ci 
more than $5,000.00. 
( T. 179). 
( T. 255-256). Webster was in agreement. 
8. Testimony on the Fair ~arket Value on the Undivided 
Fee Simple Estate. 
The only testimony offered at trial as to the fair 
market value of the sqeo cter' s r 1 ;hts sold by Webster to th; 
Lehmers on October 7, J80, as amended on December 20, 1980, 
was that of the Lehmers, viz., "between $1500.00 to $5,000.00.' 
(T. 348, 355-360). That estimated value was submitted Dy J. 
Brown, a certified appraiser. (T. 340) Brown testified that 
squatter's rights, ~ se, could not be evaluated as if '.hi 
property were owned in fee sil'lple, for the latter carried "11 
it the total bundle of rights in perpetuity, while squatter' 
rights were limited tc the economic utilit/ and life >t 
house and the use of the surface in connection with the hou''· 
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r,r·1wr1 testl tied that the highest and best use of the 
,,n.,,c', rights was not for condominium or high density, new 
c"CSL'1:0 nt1al use, as the owner was not entitled to legally 
elace U1e property to such use. (T. 353-354, 361). 
ky a motion _1:_2 limine, the Lehmers requested that the 
11 str1 t 2ourt exclude any evidence and expert testimony as to 
, nP fa 1 r market value of Webster's squatter's rights ( R. 
171-2721 on the theory that such testimony was irrelevant to 
the issues before the court. The district court denied the 
"''ti,Jn iri limine and over the continuing objection of the 
1el1merc;, permitted the testimony of a real estate salesman, L. 
01a, as t8 the fair market value of the entire undivided fee 
sunple as of October 1980. ( T. 65, 68, 77-78). Pia testified 
that as of that date, the highest and best use of the Webster 
squattPr's rights was for condominium development and that the 
squatter's rignts would have sold on the market for between 
5240,000.00 and $400,000.00 (T. 69, 83). 
Pia had no comparable sales of any squatter's rights 
hadn<J been sold for a per acre or per square foot price that 
'•ould begin to approach such values. Indeed, Pia was not 
awate of a sale or even an offer to sell any squatter's rights 
"' '11. (T. 91). The district court did not explain the 
'"' ''Jllale nf its ruling admitting testimony of the fair market 
olue nt the undivided fee simple to prove the value of 
(T. 68-69). 
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9. Attempted Rescission by Webster. 
After Webster had signed the contract, ha·j re 1 JP'·o: 
part performance by Lehmers of the purchase price, and .1 .. r." 
his occupancy of the house in November 1980, Webst~r hac 
conversation with a friend and businessman, John Fritch, ,r,: 
told Webster that he probably had sold his squatter's tnteres: 
to the Lehmers for an inadequate sum. ( T. 210-217 I. Folio«-
ing such meeting, Webster engaged in further actions of part 
performance of the contract and requested further [Jerfnrmance 
on the part of the Lehmers without attempting to avoid or 
disavow in the least the agreement of October 7, 1980, 
(T. 187-189). 
In february of 1981, Webster notified Lehmers •ha· 
he intended to rescind the original and modified agreeme'.: 
because he be 1 ieved he had not received enough money for i:. 
(T. 300-302; EX. 23, Ex. 24). Lehmers reJected Webst2r'; 
attempt at rescission and in early february of 1981 adv,s1·: 
Webster that they were prepared to tender to 1-lebster the f, .. 
amount due under the terms of the agreement. ( T. 299,, 
Lehmers remain prepared to tender full payment and complet' 
the contract. ( T. 303). 
10. The District Court's Amended findings of fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
The following is a summary of the findings j 
conclusions entered by 1e district court and which were nc: 
supported by competent evidence and are contrary to the Jaw. 
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r rtHJINGS OF FACT 
( l) Finding ot Fact 2. Webster trusted the 
: .. >c1"'""'rc; .,nd placed confidence in them to the extent that he 
iell that that confidence would not be abused. ( R. 494) • 
( 2) F1nd1ng of Fact 3. After the death of his 
wife in 1975, Webster, through the time of the transaction, 
~ecarne despondent and depressed to the extent that his affairs 
suftered and he had a severe drinking problem. ( R. 494). 
( 3) Finding of Fact 5. Webster has an obvious 
lack of mental capacity or training to independently under-
stano the effect of the sub)ect transaction (R. 495). 
( 4) Finding of Fact 8. Webster believed on 
>,ctobec 7, 1980 and continued to believe through February 18, 
1981 that the subJect property was owned by BLM; yet, signifi-
cantly, no discussion regarding fee ownership ensued during 
the contract negotiations. ( R. 496). 
( 5) Finding of Fact 9. The property had a 
"f!otent1al" fair market value at the time of the transaction 
Lo Webster of $240,000.00 to $400,000.00, which he contracted 
away for $5,000.00. ( R. 496). 
( 6) Finding of Fact 10. Webster would not have 
sr!~ the subJect property for the $5,000.00 sum had he known it 
w.is not on BLM land. The mining company (Royal Street) would 
ho~e sold him fee title for 50 cents a square foot. (R. 496). 
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B. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
( 1) Conclusion of Law 1. There 
disparate sophistication regarding financial 
existed ,~rr.:ssl/ 
and real est 3 rp 
matters to the extent that the subject transaction wac 
considered by the court to be at arm's length. ( R. 497 I. 
( 2) Conclusion of Law 2. Webster was not guilt~· 
of negligence in not being aware of fee ownership nor was hto 
unawareness the result of an inexcusa'.Jle lack of due care. 
( R. 497). 
( 3) Conclusion of Law 4. There existed a un1-
lateral mistake of fact on the part of Webster regarding own-
ership of the property suft icient to warrant rescission. The 
unilateral mistake of fact specifically related to a material 
feature of the contract, i.e. the purchase price and under 
such circumstances Webster did not act negligently. (R. 4981, 
( 4) :onclusion of Law 5. There existed a ccn-
fidential relationship between Webster and the Lehmers baseu 
upon trust and friendship developed over a period of years 
which was abused and this constituted grounds for rescission. 
The subject transaction was the result of undue influence 
exercised by Lehmers over Webster. (R. 498) 
( 5) Conclusion of Law 6. 
mutual mistake of fact regardin he parties' hel1et .c· 
respect to title of the subject property being held in J01 "
1 
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tnz 
1_e 11 ancy rather than tenancy in common. Such mutual mistake of 
tict constitutes a basis for rescission. (R. 498-99) 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED 
IN DENYING THE LEHMER MOTION IN LIMINE 
AND IN ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE UNDIVIDED FEE 
SIMPLE ESTATE. 
Prior to commencement of trial, Lehmers filed a 
motion in l imine to exclude from evidence testimony relating 
to the value of the squatter's right sold by Webster. The 
bases of the motion were that the executed contract specified 
the purchase price, that Webster sought only rescission 
because of mistake and did not claim that Lehmers had fraudu-
lently misrepresented the value of the property, that the 
SS,000.00 purchase price was, in law, adequate consideration, 
and that the question of the value of the squatter's rights 
•as, therefore, legally irrelevant. (R. 271-272). The motion 
was denied without prejudice to renew the same at the time of 
trial. ( R. 301) • 
While it was error for the district court to deny the 
motion in limine, the most conspicuous error occurred when the 
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trial unfolded and Webster attempted to introduce c•nocii', ,, 
to the fair market value of the undivided fee simple Polar•,,,, 
show the value of his "squatter's rights". [. f) s) • 
objection was made by Lehmers to this proposed testirnoni 
the ground that even if the court were going to consider as ar 
issue the value of a squatter's right, the fair: market val'~• 
of the total undivided fee had nothing to do, whatsoever, ,, 1 ~ 1, 
the evaluation of a squatter:' s right, that there was no faun-
dation for: such testimony, and that sales of fee si[l\ple 
interests in property could not, as a matter of law, be uti-
lized as comparative data 
squatter's right.~/ 
to determine the value of a 
The district court denied the obJection without ela-
boration and proceeded to receive all of Webster's allege~ 
expert testimony on (1) the highest and best use of the 
~I It was acknowledged by the parties that a squatter's right 
entitled the claimant to only the possessory use of the frame 
house and appurtenant lands for so long as the house had eco-
nomic, functional utility. The quitclaim deed, by which 
Webster and his wife acquired their squatter's interest on May 
3, 1948, described the interest to be: 
"the following described house located in Park City, Summit 
County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
That certain Four Room frame dwelling house, being 
the tenth house on the South Side of u.P.R.R. Track 
and Heber Avenue or Deer Valley, in Park City, 
Summit County, State of Utah." 
The wooden structure was at least 60 to 70 years old. 
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cw,atter:'s r:ights being high density condominium development, 
, 2 1 sales of the undivided fee simple interest of other pro-
~.ert ies in the Deer valley area at prices upwards of 
s400,0U0.00 and (3) the fair: market value of the undivided fee 
sunple estate, upon which Webster's squatter's rights were 
located, being between $240 ,000 .00 - $400 ,000 .00. (T. 68-75, 
'j9-9 1 ) • 
\. The Distr:1ct Cour:t Pr:ejudicially Erred in Denying 
tne Motion in Limine. 
This was not a case in which the fair market value of 
Webster's squatter rights was in direct controversy. Webster 
did not establish or claim fraud, misrepresentation of or 
mistake as to the fair value of the squatter's rights. This 
was a str:aight-forward transaction for the purchase of the 
squatter's rights which Lehmers claimed was an arms length 
tr:ansact ion. Under the ruling case law of this Court in 
Dalton v. Jerico, 642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982), market value of 
thE proper:ty is an irrelevant issue in determining the availa-
b1lity of the equitable remedy of rescission. Stated this 
Cuur:t: 
"[I]t is not for a court to rewrite a contract 
improvidently entered into at arm's length or 
to change a bargain indirectly on the basis of 
supposed equitable principles." 
642 P.2d at 750. 
'oee also, Park valley Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65 (Utah 
l '" 81 ) . 
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It is true that Webster claimed that as nf Oct"i,c, 
1980, a "confidential relationship" existed between hJmsc;' 
and Mary Lehmer. While the nature of that conf1dent1a) rei:,. 
tionship remained an undefined enigma throughout the trial, 
argument could have been made that testimony on the value 
the squatter's rights should be received on the limited 155 ,Je 
of the damages that were sustained as a result of any abuse'.,:, 
Lehmers of the alleged relationship. But no such proffer was 
made, and the value testimony was admitted by the trial cour• 
on all issues in the case. Such admission was patent error, 
2. The Trial Court Erred PreJudicially in Receiving Value 
Testimony on the Fee Simple Interest. 
Even if it were argued that the opinion testimony or, 
the value of the squatter's rights was admissible for 1 
limited purpose, that in no way would condone what the d1s-
trict court pennitted to "'ke place at trial, namely, that in 
proving the value of the s_,uatter' s rights, testimony could be 
admitted as to the fair market value of the undivided fee 
simple estate. That fee simple estate was not sold by \'/ebster 
to Lehmers and was not in any way before the court. 
Yet the trial judge pennitted testimony on highest 
and best use and the fair market value of the squatter'' 
rights tc ':le measured as though those rights wel'.e th".___f'..l.J.ll' ,, 
lent of the fee simple interest. The law will not >Jennie 
I 
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interest to be evaluated based upon a hypothetical 
,nd ,1,:antitatively larger interest than existed at the date of 
State of Utah v. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 248, 291 
~.2d 1028 ( 1956); State of Utah v. Peak, 1 U.2d 263, 265 P.2d 
630 ( 19531; State v. Evans, 634 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1981). In 
~, a landowner in eminent domain claimed his unsub-
auided property had a highest and best use for residential 
subdivision as of the date of valuation, and thereupon 
attempted to introduce expert testimony as to the fair market 
value of the property as subdivided land. This Court squarely 
rejected such attempt, stating that: 
It [the unsubdivided parcel] must go, to the 
condemnor for its fair market value as is, 
irrespective of any claimed value based on an 
aggregate of values of individual lots in a 
subdivision which one hopes to sell at a 
tuture time to individuals rather than to an 
individual. The test is not what the lots 
,iill bring when and if 62 willing buyers come 
along, but what the tract, as a unit, and as 
is, platted or not, and in whatever state of 
completion, will bring from a willing buyer of 
the whole tract." (Emphasis added) 
291 P.2d at 1029-1030. 
The squatter's rights were to be evaluated in the 
condition it was in at the time in question and not as though 
the squatter's rights had somehow blossomed into an undivided 
F~~ simple interest. State Road Comm. v. Valentine, 10 U.2d 
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132, 349 P.2d 321 (1960); _u_. __ s_. __ v_. __ 3_._5_4_4_'-'A_c_r_e'-s=-o_E_ ~, • 
1 
F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1944). 
The law is firmly settled in this state thdt 
determining the value of property interest, a higher and Ott 
ferent use of the interest may be considered if such ·•ere 
within the realm of probability. State Road Comm. v. Williams, 
22 U. 2d 301, 452 P. 2d 548 ( 1969); State Road Comm. v, ilcobs, 
16 U.2d 167, 397 P.2d 463 (1964). Thus Webster might ha,·e ' 
been able to show that the squatter's rights could have boon 
placed to a higher and more valuable use than as a 60-70 year 
old deteriorated bungalow house, if the higher use were rea 18• 
nably probable)./ But the fatal flaw in the Webster testimony 
and in the district court's ruling receiving that evidence is 
that Webster's expert, Pia, appraised the undivided fee simple 
interest of the underlying property as though it had alread:· 
been merged, as an accomplished fact, with the squatter's 
rights as of the date of the transact ion, October 7, 1980. 
2f Webster failed to show at trial that as of October 1980, 
he could or would have purchased the undivided fee interest 
underlying his squatter rights from Royal Street for something 
in the neighborhood of 50/1 per square foot. If such testimony 
had been presented, it would have been speculative and conjec-
tural, Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Co. 40 Utah 
126, 121 Pac. 584 (1911), for the ad hoc policy of Royal Street 
did not and could not rise to a l;g;.lly, justiciable interest. 
United States v. Petty, 327 u.s. 372, 380 n. 9 (1945). 
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ro put it in a slightly different manner, Webster 
iever nftered and the district court never received any testi-
;ncny f ,1,m Webster as to the market value of the squatter's 
rqhts, even considering the probable highest and best use of 
chose rights. Rather, what the district court erroneously 
perrn1 tted was the squatter's rights to be appraised as though 
it were the undivided fee simple interest. Had Webster owned 
the undivided fee instead of merely squatter's rights on 
October 7, 1980, his testimony on property value would have 
been no different than what he presented at trial. 
The fallacy of the district court's ruling was sub-
stantially preJudicial and cannot be permitted to stand. 
State v. Tedesco, supra at 1030. 
3. The Attempt of the District Court to Cure its Error 
Failed. 
It is not as though the district court was unaware 
that it was in troubled waters under its unprecedented ruling 
allowing Webster's value testimony on the fee simple estate. 
!11deea, the court tried to avoid the palpable error by signing 
a finding of fact that "the property [vis-a-vis the squatter's 
rights] had a potential fair market value * 
t::i S40U,OOO.OO". Finding of Fact No. 9. 
* * of S240,000.00 
The trouble with 
t~1s tactic is that "potential" market value of the squatter's 
rights is not the test under which Webster may prevail 
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assuming, arguendo, that a con fie · ial relationship het•eec 
Lehmers and Webster were otherwise established. "Potential" 
market value is, by definition, inherently speculativ~, con-
jectural, and involves mere possibilities. Rather, if '" 
evidence had established a confidential relationship, the 
legally relevant test is the fair market value of tr,e 
squatter's rights as of the date of the transaction. State', 
Tedesco, supra. 
4. The Only Admissible Value Testimony was that of Lehmers. 
All of the Webster testimony on value, including the 
purported comparable sales, related only to the market value 
of the fee simple estate and the property underlying Webster's 
squatter's rights. The only competent evidence on the market 
value of the squatter's rights as of October 1980 came from 
the expert witness, Brown, for Lehmers. Based on several 
approaches, Brown concluded that the fair market value of the 
squatter's rights was between Sl,500.00 and $5,000.00. [T, 
348, 355-360). Brown stated that the prospects of a willing 
buyer of the squatter's rights being able to obtain a more 
substantial interest in the underlyinq property through the 
possible purchase from Royal Street was too remote and uncer-
tain to be given credence. (T. 352-353). 
Thus, even if Webster had established a conflden' 1' 
relationship between Lehmers and himself, the only competent 
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,,v,Jence establishes that the contr:act pr:ice of $5,000.00 was 
, 3 , r and at mar:ket. 
POINT I I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT A UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF 
FACT ON THE PART OF WEBSTER WAS PROVEN 
AND THAT RESCISSION WAS JUSTIFIED. 
1. Under the Contr:olling Case Law, Webster: Failed Absolutely 
to Exer:c1se Or:dinar:y Diligence to Discover: the Tr:uth of 
the Claimed Mistaken Fact. 
Webster:'s claim that he enter:ed into the contr:act of 
sale with Lehmer: under: a unilater:al mistake of fact was not 
only flawed, but it was ver:y late in coming. He contended 
that, at the time of the tr:ansaction, it was his under-standing 
that the fee simple estate under: lying his squatter:' s r:ights 
''as owned by the Bur:eau of Land Management and that had he 
known Royal Str:eet owned it r:ather: than the BLM, he would not 
have sold to Lehmer:s his squatter:'s r:ights at the aqr:eed upon 
price. It is noteworthy that such claim of unilater:al mistake 
by Webster: was never: made until the eve of tr:ial. 
Notwithstanding the belated ar:gument, the distr:ict 
c,)urt, under: Conclusion of Law No. 4, determined that a unila-
teral mistake of fact was made by Webster which warranted 
rescission. That conclusion is manifest legal error and must 
be set aside. 
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In Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724 (IJL3 h IY"I 
this Court stated that not only must a claim for r_ <::'Sc 
based on unilateral mistake be proven by clear and ccin,:ir,.'1· 
evidence, but the: 
"mistake must have occurred notwithstanding 
the exercise of ordinary diligence by the 
party making the mistake." 
231 P.2d at 727. 
The evidence in tnis case places beyond any : 1spute 
the cardinal fact that Webster never exercised any deluience, 
whatsoever, during more than 33 years of holding c.:s 
squatter's rights, to determine the nature of the underlpcr, 
fee simple interest. He never consulted a title firm or legai 
counsel, he did not consult the county recorder or ccor.: 1 
assessor, and he never made any attempt to speak with an·1· 
officials of the SLM or united Park City Mining Compary 1 
its successor, Royal Street) (T. 120, 133, 147-149, 161-16i,, 
He blithely assumed from a social converat1on in the ne1·;c· 
borhood that because a certain individual maintained a iara.v 
on SLM land several hundred yards to the west, his squauer" 
home was on SLM land. ( T. ll8). Such conduct, or the lac· 
thereof, by Webster, hardly constitutes the "exercise of ordi· 
nary diligence" as required by th is Court's opinion : 
Ashworth. 
In point of fact, Webster's conduct was ne•J t 1ge 1" 
reflected a substantial lack of diligence in discovering "" 
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1nEnrmation that was readily available to him. Webster 
3 , ,, 0 t ,:har,]e the consequences of his negligence to the 
u,rnd~s 1n claiming unilateral mistake of fact. Mikkelson v. 
vca_21_ Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982); Jardine v. 
Brunswick Coreoration, 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967). 
The district court prejudicially erred in finding 
1_fi,ec the unilateral mistake of fact as to the title of the 
under 1·11ng fee could, under the extant circumstances, warrant 
rescission of the contract. 
2. There was a Failure by Webster to Show Any Reliance 
on this Claimed Mistake of Fact. 
There is an equally difficult, if not more serious 
hurdle facing Webster and the district court's ruling on the 
alleged mistake of fact. Webster testified four times on 
cJeriosit1on and at trial without equivocation, that as of the 
date ot the transaction it would not have made any difference 
tu h1m whether his squatter's rights were situated on BLM land 
(as he thought) or whether he was on Royal Street property --
he would still have sold his squatter's rights to the Lehmers 
at that time for $5,000.00. (T. 147-148; Webster, 1/7/83 depo. 
pp. 72, 95, 97-99). For example, in Webster's deposition of 
renuary 7, 1983, pp. 98-99, Webster stated: 
Mr, Webster, why didn't you check out owner-
ship of your property over in Coalville at the 
county recorder's office before October 7th, 
1980? 
Why? 
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Q. Y 5, sir, wh iidn't you? 
A. guess I d1un't care. 
Q. You didn't care whether it was on BLM land or 
not? You didn't want to c~eck to really see 1 1 
t:'hat was the truth, did you? 
A. Yeah, I didn't care. 
And at trial, Webster again repeated his lack of any cu1tcer· 
as of October 1980, with regard to whet:-.er the fee simp,1 
underlying his squatter's rights was owned by the BLM er'.. 
anyone else. (T. 146-148) 
Thus, if the ownership of the underlying fee was 
no consequence to Webster in his sale of his squatter's ngw 
to Lehmers and if he would, as testified, have nonethele'' 
sold the squatter's rights to Lehmers for the staterl prne 
even if he had known that the fee was owned by Royal Stree:. 
the obvious query is how was this man prejudiced 
claimed mistake f fact? The answer is equally obvioc tnac 
Webster was not prejudiced and has no standing to ask a co•.:· 
of equity for rescission. The district court substant1; .. 
erred in ignoring the absence of any reliance by Web,ter 
his claimed mistaken fact. 
Webster failed to show by clear and convincing ev:· 
dence the required basis for unilateral mistake, ~--
Bastian, 567 P. 2d 1100 (Utah 1977). The trial court ,.re. 
cially erred. 
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POINT II I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT WAS 
SUFFICI~NT TO PERMIT RESCISSION. 
Under Conclusion of Law No. 6, the trial court erro-
neouslj determined that a mutual mistake of fact existed 
regarding the parties belief that the squatter's rights of 
Webster were held in joint tenancy between he and his wife 
when in tact, the squatter's rights were held as tenants in 
common. The reservoir of case law need not be exhausted to 
ascertain the fundamental legal error in this conclusion. 
To begin with, mutual mistake of fact is generally 
not a basis for rescission, but for retormation, if possible, 
0f the contract. Through that remedy, the integrity of the 
contract can be maintained (unless the mistake would have 
caused both parties not to execute the agreement) and the 
agreement reframed to express the true intent. 
Secondly, the mistaken fact in Webster's title to his 
squatter's rights was one that would have injured the Lehmers 
only and not Webster. Webster made no warranties as to the 
title to his squatter's rights, Lehmers demanded none, and the 
lehmers clearly bore the risk of the infirmities in the title 
t,1 De conveyed by Webster. 13 Williston on Contracts Sl566A 
l'" 355. Thus, Webster cannot be heard to complain about the 
mutual mistake of fact because he suffered no prejudice. He 
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merely was placed in a pos l t ion of conveying less ct 
interest in his squatter's rights than he had agreecl L'J 
vey. Lehmers made no claim at trial that the considerat_, 
$5,000.00 should be diminished by reason of Webster's 11 ~, 
nishment of title. So far as Lehmers were concerned, Webst•': 
agreed to convey whatever interest, if any, he owned in th, 
squatter's rights. Turtle Management Inc. v. ',·agger :1anag_e_-
ment, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). As stated by the Suprene 
Court of Maine in Bibber v. Carville, 63 Atl. 303 (Maine 
1905): 
"Defects in title do not entitle the grantor 
to a rescission of the conveyance, [citation 
omitted] We see no reason why the grantee, who 
acted in good faith, is not entitled in good 
conscience to retain the benefit of the con-
tract which he made. The grantor, who received 
the full price he set upon the property, has 
no equitable right to deprive him of it simply 
because he was mistaken as to his title, and 
is liable upon his covenants. While a court 
of equity may decree the rescission of 1 con-
tract for a mistake which is unilateral, the 
power should not be exercised against a party 
whose conduct has in no way contributed to or 
induced the mistake, and who will obtain no 
unconsionable advantage thereby." 
63 Atl. at 304. 
It was prejudicial error for the lower court to con· 
elude that the mutual mistake of fact as to Webster's title 
authorized him to rescind. That claim of mutual mistake was; 
mere additional pretext for Webster to use as a crutch in 
attempt to dishonor a binding agreement, 
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POINT IV 
WEBSTER FAILED TO PROVE A 
LACK Of MENTAL CAPACITY. 
1he evidence in the record clearly reflects that 
l<ebster was in full control of his mental faculties, that he 
had capacity to enter into the subject agreements; and that he 
knew what he was doing with respect to entering into and per-
fot:111ing under the agreements. The district court's finding 
that Webster had a lack of mental capacity or training to 
independently understand the effect of the transaction is not 
supported by the evidence and contradicts the applicable law 
of contractual capacity. 
1. The Legal Standard of Contractual Capacity. 
The test for determining whether a person has mental 
capacity to enter into a contract is well established in Utah. 
In ordinary contracts the test is, Were 
the mental faculties so deficient or impaired 
that there was not sufficient power to compre-
hend the subject of the contract, its nature 
and its probable consequences, and to act with 
discretion in relation thereto, or with rela-
tion to the ordinary affairs of life. 
Hatch v. Hatch, 4 Utah 218, 148 P. 433, 438 ( 1914). The same 
test has been adopted for the determination of whether or not 
granter has sufficient mental capacity to make a deed. 
Anderson v, Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142, (1945); 
Peterson v, Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1979). See also, 
Jimenez v. O'Brien, 117 Utah 82, 213 P.2d 337, (1949). A 
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finding of a lack of contractual ,·1pacity must be by ",-lear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence." Jimenez, supra, 
Jimenez is particularly instructive in appl/ing 1,t_ir, 
law on contractual capacity to the facts in this case, 
Hie 
plaintiff, Jimenez, while still in the hospital after an autc-
mobile accident, signed a form release and a hand-writt~o 
"supporting statement" for the insurance carrier of the other 
party in the auto accident in exchange for payment of al; 
hospital costs and $1,000.00. Three weeks later he signec 
another release in exchange for payment of an additiona. 
hospital bill. 
In an action to rescind the releases, Jimenez test1-
fied that although he read the releases, he really did not 
understand them. Id. at 341. Several of Jimenez's friends 
testified that after the accident he had a "depressed anj 
changeable" personality and at other times he appeared to be 
irrational. One of Jimenez's attending physicians testified 
that he was not able to "reason normally" while in the hos~i-
tal. Id. at 342. 
This Court said that the expert testimony was not 
dispositive and even if one assumed the accuracy of the test!-
mony of Jimenez's friends: 
[f]atigue, nervousness, poor emotion control, 
and lack of ability to concentrate are nrt 
necessarily indicative of contractual inL,_ 
pacity although they may well affect a person's 
judgment. [T]he things a person does 
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and says at or about the time he enters into a 
contract are the best indicia of his mental 
capacity to make the same." 
[d. dl 343. 
under Utah law, Webster is bound by the subject 
agreement. He read the agreement, understood it and accepted 
money pursuant to it. 
[C]ontracts between parties are binding 
not because their mental ability nor their 
Judgment is equal, but because they both possess 
that degree of mental power which the law 
recognizes as a minimum for persons contracting, 
viz. sufficient power to comprehend the subject 
of a contract, its nature and probable conse-
quences, and to act with discretion in relation 
thereto, or with relation to the ordinary 
affairs of life. 
Id. at 343. 
2. The Evidence Demonstrates Webster's Capacity to Contract. 
When Webster entered into the contract, he had the capacity to 
read and understand the agreement. (T.137, 138; Webster 1/7/83 
depo. pp. 57-58). He had entered into written consumer con-
tracts in the past with a full understanding of what he was 
doing. (Webster 5/4/82 depo. pp. 17-18). During his employ-
rnent as a mechanic Webster had read, understood and used 
various technical manuals and printed materials. (T.137; 
Webster 1/7/83 depo. pp. 57-58). 
Webster fully comprehended the subject agreement. 
11. 135, 170-174; Webster 5/4/82 depo. pp. 23-25, 30, 35). 
The only limitation Webster demonstrated before the district 
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court was some difficulty in reading aloud the 
This is evidence only of Webster's admitted diUicuHy ir, 
nouncing some words. ( T. 135) • Webster's ability to un,
1
,,, 
stand the agreement is demonstrated by his several visits 
the Lehmers to obtain advances against the agreements. (-,. 
125-127, 179, 183). As in Jimenez, Webster's conduct under-
scored his understanding of the agreements. 
At the time Webster entered into the agreement, he ,3, 
physically and mentally healthy, he had not been drinking and 
was not under the influence of alcohol. (T. 142-144: Webstec 
1/7/83 depo. 23-24). In fact, in December of 1980, 1o1hen he 
modified and ratified the original agreement, he was in a par-
ticularly good frame of mind because he planned to move to Hebec 
City to be married. (Webster 1/7/83 depo. 104-105). Webster 
did not produce any evidence from doctors, social 1o1orkers " 
others with the expertise to support his self-serving and after 
the fact claims that he suffered from diminished capacity because 
of depression or consumption of alcohol. 
contradicts that claim. 
His own testimony 
The evidence "clearly preponderates against" the d1s· 
trict court's finding by "clear and convincing" evidence, that 
Webster lacked the mental capacity to enter into the sub]ec' 
agreement. See, Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d lllL 11 '; 
N.l (Utah 1982). The district court's finding of a ;ir' 
mental capacity plainly ignores we 11-es ta bl i shed Utah law . 
1R • 
POINT V 
WE8STER FAILED TO PROVE A CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATIONSHIP OR UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
Webster claimed he trusted the Lahmers, but there is 
absolutely no evidence in the trial record to even suggest 
that he '-'as dominated by or under the influence of the Lehmers 
At best, their relationship was only one of 
casual neighbors. Webster proudly acknowledged he never 
relied upon the Lehmers' for business advice or the conduct of 
his cay-to-day affairs. Based upon these uncontroverted facts 
and a('pl icable legal standards the district court erred in 
making a finding of a confidential relationship and concluding 
there "as undue influence in the formation of the agreement. 
l. The District Court Erred in Finding a Confidential 
Relationship. 
This Court has a high legal standard for the creation 
of a confidential relationship. In Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 
Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (1965), the Utah Supreme Court 
declared: 
The evidence is undisputed that there existed 
among the parties sincere affection, trust and 
confidence, but is this legally sufficient to 
constitute a confidential relationship giving 
rise to the presumption that the transaction 
was unfair? We think not. 
The relationship must be such as it would lead 
an ordinarily prudent person in the management 
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of his business affair-s to r-epose th~t i>e•ir~e 
of confidence in the other- par-ty which l•r;el; 
r-esults in the subst1tut1on ot the wll l -it r~,p 
later- for- that of the for-mer- tn the ma•erial . 
matter-s involved in the tr-ansaction. 
Mer-e confidence in one per-son by another 15 
not sufficient alone to const1tute such a 
relationship. (Emphasis added). 
The holding in Bradbury was reaffirmed in ~ 
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978) when this Cour• ol.: 
that a confidential relationship "is not to be found en"' 
basis of mere friendship or- social or religious atfiltati-,ri; 
between the parties." The only evidence in the record is tha: 
Webster- and Lehmers had the casual contacts typical of neigh· 
bor-s who have little or no involvement in each others lives, 
The district court saw before him a lawyer ar.:, 
retired miner and concluded that Mary Lehmer should have sm 
undefined obligation to Flo yd Webster. The record and che lai 
do not support that conclusion because Webster, as a matter.: 
fact, was ciot dependent on the Lehmers. Webs te L's test irr.::-. 
demonstrated that he had a broad range of life experiences ec. 
was able to effectivelj and competently conduct his day-u-di, 
activities. (T. 169-171). Webster admitted that he dio not 
look to the Lehmers for any personal, financial, business o: 
legal advice. (T. 168). He lived independently from and free 
of any infludence or dominance of the Lehmers (T. 168-1° 01 · 
The district court attempted to bottom its t11r•J 1" 
a confidential relationship upon the casual friendship betwei 
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,,~i.st~t a11d the Lehmers and Webster's own self-serving testi-
.nl tr1at he trusted Mary Lehmer (R. 494, 498). In Bradbury, 
":'.P~· thl'.3 Court held that even where both parties testified 
•hot they "had trust 3nd confidence" in each other, that is 
not sutf1c1ent to establish a confidential relationship • .19_. 
rhere is not a scintilla of credible or competent 
evidence in the case at bar to support a finding of a con-
fidential relationship. 
2. The Trial Court Erred in Finding Undue Influence. 
The district court made the erroneous finding that 
the misuse of a confidential relationship justifies the con-
:lusl•)n that the transaction was the result of undue influ-
ence. To the contrary, the district court must first find the 
c•rnfldential relationship and then must find undue influence 
uetCJre it can conclude that the confidential relationship was 
:::1suse(j. As •,;i th any misuse of a confidentail relationship, 
there rnust be facts to support a finding as to how the con-
fident1al relationship was misused. There are no facts in 
this r~cord to support a finding of undue influence by the 
Lchmers over Webster. 
The cardinal element in the doctrine of undue influ-
enre 1" the existence of influence or persuasion asserted by 
_rie t~irr-_y over the other. The victims of the undue influence 
st lie "impelled to do that which he would not have done had 
h2 he~n tree from such controlling influence." In Re Lavelle's 
~~· 122 Utah 253, 248 P.2d 372, 375-376 (1952), 
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The evidence is clear that not only was there no 'Jr,d,,, 
influence or persuasion by Lehmers, but that there was no "Pt-
suasion at all, unfair or otherwise. The only inducement " 
persuasion which the Lehmers offered Mr. Webster to enter tct-
the contract was the the purchase price of $5,000.00. IT. 101_ 
102, 167-170; Webster 5/4/82 depo. p. 26). 
Even if this Court were to find a confidential rela-
tionship, a conclusion of undue influence does not necessani; 
follow, and in this instance does not follow at all. 
It is not enough that a person is susceptible 
to undue influence as a result of the con-
fidential relationship. It is not enough that 
the influence is exerted upon that person. 
[citation omitted] Persuasion is unfair (or 
influence is undue) only when it overcomes the 
will of another such that their own free 
agency is destroyed. [citation omitted] 
Undue influence must be proved by evidence 
that is clear, cogent and convincing. 
Furguson v. Jeanes, 619 P.2d 369, 372-373 (Wash. App. 1980i, 
~he record in this case is simply devoid of any evidence ci 
unfair persuasion or conduct by Lehmers that they overcame t".e 
will of Webster. 
The Trial Court relied upon 13 Williston on Contraet 0 
1625 in finding undue influence. (R. 498) Yet even Williston 
dictates a contrary finding. Williston noted the Courts "i 
find an absence of undue influence if "the party clatmtn·~ 
be victim of undue influence had independent advice or an 
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-~portunity to obtain such advice." 
J62S, P• 778. 
13 Williston on Contracts 
The Lehmers did not prevent Webster in any way from 
1 n,1est1gat1ng the status of the property, either before or 
after Webster signed the agreement. (Webster 1/7/83 depo. 
94-95). Moreover, he lived on the property for forty years 
without investigating the title to the underlying property. 
Jn add1t1on, Webster discussed the sale with John Fritch be-
t.ween the October an December agreements. (Webster 1/7/83 
de po. pp. 91-9 2) • Webster was only interested in receiving 
the $5,000.00 price offered by the Lehmers and the offer would 
have been accepted regardless of any information or advice 
that was available to him. (T. 147-148). Webster was comple-
tely indifferent to his own affairs and not subject to any 
undue influence in the formation of or in the acceptance of 
the benefits of the contract. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
LEHMERS' SPECH'IC PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. 
Lehmers im good faith undertook the steps and obliga-
tions r-equired of them by the agreement to close the tran-
c,,ct l'.Jn with webs te r. They advanced $ 900. 00 to Webster be-
tween October 7, 1980 and December 21, 1980, secured a survey, 
1 T.293-294; Ex. 12-D), and paid the utility fees. (T.296). 
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rn February of 1981 they sent $1,100.00 to Websler 
attempted to arrange for a closing on the propel'."ty and paymen. 
of the balance due. (T.299). Lehmers are ready, willtng ir· 
able to complete the agreement. (T.303-304) 
Specific performance is a remedy which is ~rante 1 
when damages cannot be accurately ascertained or the part
1 
cannot be adequately compensated at law. Delivery Service ano 
~ ·r Company v. Heiner Equipment, 635 P.2d 21 (Utah ]Y8J,. 
The agreement is a contract for the sale of a squatter'; 
right. Since it is unique, the damages for breach of the con-
tract cannot be determined with certainty and specific perfor-
mance is an appropriate remedy. 
The district court has failed to find any vagueneso 
or ambiguity in the agreement. A. fair reading of the agree-
ment in light of the reasonable expectations of the part1e; 
demonstrates that it is sufficiently clear and complete tc 
warrant specific enforcement. See, Nixon & Nixon, Inc.>', 
John New and Associates, 641P.2d144, 146 (Utah 19821 3nJtne 
cases cited therein. The district court erred in not ordenn: 
specific performance of the agreement for the sale of the 
Webster's squatter's rights in Park City, Utah. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
~his case requires reversal. The suit comes dnwn 
little more than the ordinary situation in which a seller, 
after having executed, requesting performance by the buyer, 
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-,,J s\Jbstantially performing, himself, the bargain, second-
•""0-;es the agreement and decides that he wants to back-out. 
1ecause -:ne of the buyers happens to be a lawyer, the "sitting-
1uck" claim is made that a confidential relationship existed 
3 nd the lawyer abused it to her advantage. The evidence 
sim['1/ will not permit a finding of a confidential rela-
t 10 nsh ip or an abuse thereof by Lehmers. The controlling law 
has consistently precluded a party from renouncing his 
-:ontractual commi t:nent under the circumstances of this case. 
The lower court prejudicially erred in permitting the 
squatter's rights of Webster to be evaluated as though the fee 
oimple estate was before the court. The attempt of the 
district court to get around that error by signing findings 
relating to the "potential" market value of the squatter 
rights, was futile, for that is not the applicable legal test. 
The expert testimony of Pia never focused on "potential" 
~arket value, but only addressed the fair market value of the 
und1v1ded tee. The squatter's rights were not even evaluated 
by Webster's witness. 
At the date of the transaction, Webster did not care 
-,iho owned the underlying fee -- he would have sold the pro-
1 ercy to Lehmers for the $5,000.00 price. It was only in 
tebruary 1981, four months later and after substantial perfor-
-na1<ce tcy both parties, that Webster changed his mind and 
••nteJ out of the deal. 
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The Lehmers are entitled to an order of specift~ Pet· 
formance in the sale of Webster's interest l n the 
rights. This Court should so order or if it ls determtnea 
that further testimony on the evaluation 
of the squatter'; 
rights should be received, a new trial should be ordered. 
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